______ is Necessary for Interpreting a Proposition

In Natural propositions (2014), Stjernfelt contends that the interpretation of a proposition or dicisign requires the joint action of two kinds of signs. A proposition must contain a sign that conveys a general quality. This function can be served by a similarity-based icon or code-based symbol. In addition, a proposition must situate or apply this general quality, so that the predication can become liable of being true or false. This function is served by an index. Stjernfelt rightly considers the co-localization of these two parts to be a primitive phenomenon. Although this primitive character would seem to bar any further analysis, I endeavor to clarify the degree of proximity sufficient to enable co-localization. Siding with Pietarinen (2014), who argues that the whole issue should not be construed in metric terms, I conclude that one cannot make sense of propositional co-localization without appealing to some form of first-person perspective

A Note on M. Barbieri’s “Scientific Biosemiotics”

A densely-packed critique of some current trends in semiotic

Tracking Inferences Is not Enough: The Given as Tie-Breaker

Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and unless we benefit from what is given in experience, we cannot know whether to affirm the antecedents of those conditionals

Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification: Dialogue

This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences

A Less Simplistic Metaphysics: Peirce’s Layered Theory of Meaning as a Layered Theory of Being

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing uninterpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced

Poinsot versus Peirce on Merging with Reality by Sharing a Quality

C. S. Peirce introduced the term “icon” for sign-vehicles that signify their objects in virtue of some shared quality. This qualitative kinship, however, threatens to collapse the relata of the sign into one and the same thing. Accordingly, the late medieval philosopher of signs John Poinsot held that, “no matter how perfect, a concept [...] always retains a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified and itself signifying.” Poinsot is touted by his present-day advocates as a realist, but I believe that, judged by realist standards, his requirement of minimal dissimilarity backfires. Poinsot thinks that, in analyzing the sign, we should stop before a full merger between sign-vehicle and object is reached. Peirce, by contrast, saw good reason to push the analysis all the way down to one isolated quality. Because such a qualitative merger can lend support to realism, I favour Peirce’s stance

BLOCKING THE ROAD: CHALLENGES TO CALIFORNIA AND WASHINGTON’S CLEAN ENERGY GOALS

My Capstone project is focused on the policy, technology and science embedded within California and Washington’s climate change legislation to achieve a certain percentage of emissions reductions by a specified future point in time as well as both states’ goal to become net-zero by 2045. My classwork and professional experiences have provided me with a strong foundation in understanding climate change from a scientific standpoint and the emerging technologies and supportive legislation that can help mitigate and potentially reverse climate change in the future. Technical knowledge of technologies like green hydrogen, carbon capture and sequestration along with more mature technologies like wind and solar are incredibly important while evaluating policy objectives for state clean energy plans and targets. Diving further into my professional experience, I have been able to observe and analyze the economics of certain clean energy technologies based on both market forces and policy intervention. Both mature and emerging clean energy technologies will continue to play a crucial role to grid reliability, affordability and provide opportunity to meet future energy demand growth. Although it may sound like a simple concept to adopt renewables and say goodbye to all fossil fuels to serve our future energy needs, it is indeed much more comprehensive and complex than that. That is where my classwork and professional experience allow me to study and evaluate the complexities that lie beneath the surface with reliability issues from extreme weather, affordability given generation, transmission, and distribution cost dynamics as well as capital costs of one type of energy project compared to another. California and Washington’s clean energy goals are arguably the most ambitious in the country which brings about its own set of challenges as both states are looking to leverage multiple ways to reduce each state’s emissions footprint while also keeping citizens safe and delivering affordable electricity. I have the knowledge and expertise to investigate integrated resource planning documents that utilities have prepared for local state commissions to determine how and when each state will look to ramp up its transition to cleaner energy. The key objective in this analysis is to determine the feasibility of California and Washington’s clean energy timelines with the methods and technologies the state’s plan to incorporate to achieve these goals, and most importantly the challenges and roadblocks they may face in the process

Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: A New Précis

I will be talking today about the limits of cognitive science. I won’t be talking about contingent shortcomings that could perhaps be remedied with, say, more time, resources, or ingenuity. Rather, I will be concerned with limitations that are “baked into” the very enterprise. The main blind spot, I will argue, is consciousness—but not for the reasons typically given. Current work in philosophy of mind can sometimes seem arcane, so my goal today will be to answer the question: why bother? I have spent a whole book and several articles trying to make sense of the qualitative dimension of consciousness, but there is no point in trying to sell a solution unless we have first established (independently of any academic literature) that there is a real problem to solve. So, if I can’t convey my position in under an hour, I can at least convey the issue that motivates it

L'atomisme, le holisme et la quête d'une tierce alternative viable

Selon John McDowell, l'atomisme et le holisme sont chacun incapables de porter fruit. Plutôt que d'osciller futilement entre ces deux pôles, il croit que nous devrions repenser notre façon de concevoir la relation liant l'esprit et le monde. Inspiré par certains passages de Kant, il nous invite donc à reconsidérer l'expérience de telle sorte qu'on y admette d'entrée de jeu l'exercice d'une liberté distinctement humaine-l'étendue de l'esprit devenant ainsi dénuée de toute contrainte externe. À notre avis, McDowell a plus de succès lorsqu'il dépeint le va-et-vient entre l'atomisme et le holisme que lorsqu'il propose une façon d'échapper à ce mouvement. Nous croyons que la fusion qu'il cherche à développer ne tient pas la route dans la mesure où, d'un point de vue naturaliste, il y a bel et bien lieu de distinguer la réceptivité empirique et la spontaneité conceptuelle. À l'encontre de McDowell, nous soutenons qu'il n'y a oscillation entre ces facultés que si l'on endosse une inférence allant du statut non-atomique des représentations au holisme, saut inductif qui repose sur une approche spéculative que nous rejetons. Le premier chapitre cherche à démontrer comment les théories holistes de filière quinéenne se fondent sur des présupposés spéculatifs et comment les éléments plus louables de la philosophie de McDowell à cet égard sont rendus impuissants par son assentiment à la critique que fait W. Sellars du "mythe du Donné". Le second chapitre reconstruit méticuleusement l'argument fort complexe qu'étale McDowell dans Mind and World, pour ensuite critiquer sa suggestion que la culture et l'éducation induisent chez l'être humain une attitude critique pouvant remplacer la friction produite par l'expérience. Le troisième chapitre soutient que la thèse de Sellars voulant que l'expérience peut causer mais non justifier nos représentations détruirait non seulement la connaissance empirique mais aussi la capacité de tirer des inférences. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre présente une nouvelle vision "constrictive" qui, par l'entremise des notions de coercition et de complexité, reconnait que la représentation du monde met en jeu une échelle plus large que l'atome mais plus petite que le tout. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Atomisme, Holisme, Représentation, John McDowell